from web site
278. See HUD REPORT, supra note 201. 279. One panelist who is a fee-for-service broker describes this as his "flat-fee plus" option, where, in addition to listing the house in the MLS and placing it on several websites, he offers the seller assistance once the buyer is found. In addition to the flat fee rate of $495 paid sometimes of listing, the "flat-fee plus" choice needs the seller also to pay $1,500 at closing.
at 68 (describing the alternative). 280. In an address at the start http://spencerwwiz989.image-perth.org/6-easy-facts-about-what-is-escheat-in-real-estate-described of the Workshop, (then Performing) Assistant Lawyer General Thomas Barnett observed that minimum-service laws and policies can be seen as no various from states passing a guideline that says: "When I stroll into McDonald's and purchase a hamburger, I'm informed that I likewise need to buy some french fries, due to the fact that the state has actually decided that it may be deceptive or misleading or bad if I only got the hamburger, spent for it and didn't realize I wasn't going to get the french fries." Barnett, Tr.
Similarly, at a recent Congressional hearing on competition in the property brokerage market, Agent Baker analogized minimum-service laws and regulations to needing a customer to have his/her whole house painted when she or he just wanted the patio painted. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 30 (statement of Rep.
Baker, member House Comm. on Financial Solutions), readily available at http://frwebgate. access.gpo. gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. cgi?dbname= 109_house_hearings & docid= f:31541. pdf. 281. See Farmer, Tr. at 105 (noting that he contends versus standard "representatives out there that deal little or no value to the transaction."). 282. See Lewis, Tr. at 179 (" While some customers may be advanced sufficient to represent themselves in some or all of the actions of a transaction, the majority of are not.").

22, 2005, readily available at http://realtytimes. com/rtcpages/20050422 _ dojstepsin. htm (quoting Texas Association of Realtors declaring that minimum-service guidelines would avoid consumer confusion); Peter G. Baker, Hiring a Broker: Should You Anticipate Less?, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, offered at http://realtytimes. com/rtcpages/20060411 _ hirebroker. htm (" [Federal government firms] argue that with disclosures and waivers consumers must have the ability to refuse any brokerage service or obligation.
We do not, for example, permit consumers to conserve money by hiring doctors who cut costs by not sanitizing surgical instruments or cleaning their hands."). 283. See Darryl W. Anderson, Minimum-Service Requirements in Real Estate Brokerage: A Response to Maureen K. Ohlhausen, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Jan. 2006, at 3-4 (arguing that minimum-service requirements are procompetitive due to the fact that they promote cost negotiations before entering a representation contract over what a fee-for-service broker will charge for all the services required by law).
See, e. g., GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. 285. Thorburn, Tr. at 96. 286. Farmer, Tr. at 73. 287. In addition, in response Get more info to an FTC questionnaire, participants from Colorado, North Dakota, Vermont, and Washington noted that complaints versus limited service brokers were minimal or nonexistent. The questionnaire is available at http://www.
htm. 288. Our evaluation of fee-for-service broker sites reveals that customers appear to have ready access to costs that fee-for-service brokers charge for additional services beyond the MLS-only alternative in advance of participating in a legal relationship. This finding weakens a necessary condition for the Take a look at the site here hold-up theory to be possible that customers only discover the prices for extra services after they have actually participated in an exclusive listing arrangement.
Ohlhausen, Minimum-Service Requirements in Realty Brokerage: A Reply to Darryl Anderson, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2006 (discussing numerous theoretical and empirical reasons that the hold-up theory does not appear to use to fee-for-service brokerage). 289. See Farmer, Tr - how to generate leads in real estate. at 71-72. 290. Kunz, Tr. at 82-83. See likewise Perriello, Tr. at 152 (speaking for Cendant, and stating that "our company believe that consumers.
must have the ability to choose their service designs as well as the service provider of those services, whether they be minimal service or full-service"). 291. Sambrotto, Tr. how long to get real estate license. at 116. 292. Farmer, Tr. at 72. 293. PATRICK WOODALL & STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, HOW THE REAL ESTATE CARTEL HARMS CONSUMERS AND HOW CONSUMERS CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES (June 2006), offered at http://www.

pdf. 294. Id. at 4-5. 295. See, e. g., Lewis, Tr. at 178-79; Sambrotto, Tr. at 114; Farmer, Tr. at 115. 296. Whatley, Tr. at 45-46. 297. See Katherine A. Pancak et al., Real Estate Agency Reform: Fulfilling the Requirements of Purchasers, Sellers, and Brokers, 25 REAL ESTATE L.J. 345, 350 (1997) (keeping in mind that company relationships can be created by actions).
Whatley, Tr. at 48. 299. Avoiding fee-for-service listings without disclosure to buyers, however, may raise concerns concerning the fulfillment of fiduciary tasks. 300. See supra Chapter I.B. 1. 301. Blanche Evans, Where Property Associations Base On MLS-Entry-Only Listings, REAL ESTATE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, readily available at http://realtytimes. com/rtapages/20050224 _ mlsentryonly. htm. 302. OHIO CODE 4735.
18 of the Revised Code and settlements conducted by a licensee pursuant to the authorization will not create or indicate an agency relationship between that licensee and the customer of that special broker."). 303. VA CODE 54. 1-2132( C) (efficient July 1, 2007) (" A licensee engaged by a seller in a genuine estate deal may, unless prohibited by law or the brokerage relationship, supply support to a buyer or prospective purchaser by performing ministerial acts.
304. WIS. CODE 452. 133 (6). 305. Sambrotto, Tr. at 90. 306. ForSaleByOwner. com Corp. v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 307. Id. at 879. 308. United States v. Real Estate Multi-List, 629 F. 2d 1351, 1374 (5th Cir. 1980) (" [W] hen broker involvement in the [MLS] is high, the service itself is economically effective and competitors from other listing services is lacking, rules which invite the unjustified exemption of any broker ought to be found unreasonable.").
See, e. g., Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F. 2d 1566, 1579-80 (11th Cir. 1991); Austin Bd. of Realtors v. E-Realty, Inc., No. Civ. A-00-CA- 154 JN, 2000 WL 34239114, at * 4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000). A conversation of the numerous private lawsuits involving declared MLS-related restraints is beyond the scope of this Report.
For a conversation of unique company agreements and other types of noting arrangements, see supra Chapter I.A. 2. 310. See Farmer, Tr. at 74-75; Sambrotto, Tr. at 90. 311. NAR 2005 SURVEY, supra note 38, at 29-30. 312. Austin Bd. of Realtors, FTC Dkt. No. C-4167; Details and Realty Services, LLC, FTC File No.
051-0065; Williamsburg Location Ass 'n of Realtors, Inc., FTC File No. 061-0268; Realtors Ass 'n of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc., FTC File No. 061-0267; Monmouth County Ass 'n of Realtors, Inc., FTC File No. 051-0217. 313. See, e. g., Details and Property Solutions, LLC, FTC File No (how to make money in real estate with no money). 061-0087, at 6 (2006) (analysis to help public comment), available at http://www.
pdf. 314. See, e. g., Austin Bd. of Realtors, FTC Dkt. No. C-4167, at 17 (2006) (complaint), readily available at http://www. ftc.gov/ os/caselist/0510219/ 0510219AustinBoardofRealtorsComplaint. pdf. 315. Id. at 27. 316. See MiRealSource, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9321 (2007) (decision and order), readily available at http://www. ftc.gov/ os/adjpro/d9321/ 070323decisionorder. pdf. 317. See, e. g., United Realty Brokers of Rockland, Ltd., Dkt.