• A serious development on the left — accompanying a flourishing of “campism” (i.e., seeing the world as divided into a U.S.-led “imperialist camp” and a “progressive camp,” which includes dictatorships in Russia and China and elsewhere) — is the rehabilitation of Joseph Stalin, elevating him into the Revolutionary Pantheon, justifying the policies and practices for which he has long been condemned. For many, this smacks of the “revisionist” project advanced by such people as David Irving: seeing Adolf Hitler and the Nazi movement as representing a reasonable German patriotism, denying the reality of a Holocaust destroying millions of Jews and others. While many on the left have effectively challenged Nazi apologists and Holocaust deniers, a systematic left-wing critique of the new wave of Stalinist revisionism has been missing. Until now, thanks to the efforts of Douglas Greene. Grover Furr — one of the authors Greene critiques — describes him as an “incompetent and dishonest Trotskyite.” But this isn’t quite right.

• One is the already-mentioned Grover Furr (1944– ), professor of medieval English literature at Montclair State University in New Jersey, who has from 2011 to 2025 published at least seventeen books defending Stalin—in some cases with a primary focus on demolishing Trotsky. This quantity of publications causes Greene to devote two chapters to Furr; his conclusions are devastating:

• The trouble with Furr’s work is not just that he makes up facts.… [H]e can cite genuine data in support of his claims. A cursory look reveals that his work is filled with abundant quotes, facts, and snippets of real information.… It is full of facts and footnotes.… [Yet] his overarching approach is to cherry pick data to fit his pre-existing conclusions. To achieve this, Furr utilizes a two-pronged approach of inflating any facts that he believes support his conclusions, and he either discredits or ignores everything which contradicts his thesis. (131)

• While not formally identified with any political group, an examination of Furr’s Montclair State website includes a Politics and Social Issues page that has a link to the homepage of the Progressive Labor Party, with this comment: “Ever since the anti-war and anti-racist movements of the ‘60s I have found this to be the best of the ‘alternative’ sources. Relentlessly anti-capitalist, resolutely pro-worker and pro-employee generally, it’s the best source of class analysis of the world’s events.” Beginning in 1962, as a Maoist-oriented split-off from the Communist Party USA, at moments it played a significant role in U.S. “new left” activities of the 1960s and early 1970s; it then broke “to the left” from Maoism, and shrank into what many perceive as an ultra-left, self-isolating, and irrelevant sect.
• There are two lesser-known figures with whom Greene deals. They lack the quantity and quality of output of Furr and Losurdo, but also enjoy a certain influence: Ludo Martens (1946–2011) and Bill Bland (1916–2001). Martens was a prominent figure in the Belgian far-left, a founder and leader of the Maoist-oriented Workers’ Party of Belgium. His key work on this topic, Another View of Stalin, was published in 1994

• Another strength of Greene’s work is that he doesn’t simply lump together the four figures in his gallery but emphasizes important differences in the ways they deal with Stalin. Of course, they all unabashedly defend Stalin’s interpretation of Marxism (i.e., his “Marxism-Leninism”). They also embrace the four elements of his basic political orientation: the “socialism in one country” commitment; the “revolution from above” that promoted forced collectivization of land and hyper-industrialization; the extensive and brutal use of repression against political opponents; and the consequent cultural regimentation to mold “correct” attitudes among the population.

• The development of a Stalin “cult of personality” (which Stalin allegedly did not support) was used by such double-dealers to cover their tracks.

• One need not be a Communist to recognize that “Stalinism,” with all of its horror, is a chapter in the liberation movement that defeated the Third Reich and that provided the impetus for anticolonialism and for the struggles against anti-Semitism and racism; every honest historian knows this. (Quoted by Greene, 27–28)

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• Importantly, although the GCC remains concerned about escalation, the crisis has highlighted the extent of the region’s strategic alignment with Washington.

   

• Amid the Israeli-US strikes, The Washington Post – cited multiple US officials asserting that the Saudis, along with Israel, had encouraged Trump to strike Iran – a claim Riyadh firmly denied. Moreover, in January, Axios reported that the Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman warned Trump that hesitation in striking Iran could embolden Tehran.

   

• It would be an overstatement to argue Riyadh decisively influenced Trump’s decision, given the US’ own military build-up prior to the strikes and Trump’s prior escalation rhetoric. However, these reports remain broadly consistent with Riyadh’s dual-track position: public calls for de-escalation while strategically aligning with the US.

   

• Indeed, its rapprochement with Iran was less an embrace than a hedge, given the Saudi government’s main concern is regional security. Notably, while Saudi Arabia condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes, it stopped short of condemning the initial US-Israeli attack, signalling its comfort in aligning strategically with Washington. Riyadh is not alone in this, given the other GCC nations – Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman – have all issued denunciations of Iran’s attacks on Gulf territory. 

   
• Iran’s strike on three oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz,

• For the rest of the Gulf, this recalibration reflects a pragmatic hedge, which has long guided its foreign policy calculus. Open opposition to US strategy risks jeopardising core security partnerships, while overt alignment against Iran invites retaliation.

   
• But further direct attacks on Gulf territory would likely push the GCC states further into Washington’s orbit. Relations with Iran are currently worsening, given the UAE closed its embassy in Tehran and recalled its ambassador and diplomatic staff.

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• The kleptocratic remainders of secular Arab nationalism in post-Nasserist Egypt and Ba’athist Syria had already lost moral legitimacy by the end of the 1980s, granting these Islamist political leaders fertile ground for germinating religiously-inclined movements during the following decades.

• The ultimate outcome of the Arab Spring, in this context, has regrettably been an intensified authoritarianism throughout the region, best example being Egypt, alongside the blossoming of jihadism in countries like Syria, while secular democratic projects failed to take root over the long-term.

• In the past three years, nothing productive has been yielded by Beijing exerting stronger influence over these two diplomatic partners. This agreement has not been the conduit by which any kind of meaningful statecraft has been exerted when it came to the questions of Gaza, Yemen, or Lebanon. All have been subjected to missile strikes and Beijing’s strongest action has been to register some manner of displeasure with the turn of events, usually in a United Nations address or Security Council statement. Barring some major social mobilization in China that compels the government to action, the Communist Party is going to prioritize their own domestic tranquility above tarrying intentionally with Islamic extremism, especially after the Uyghurs controversy became a Western liberal cause célèbre in 2020.

• A rudimentary aversion to courting domestic terrorism by foreign actors, something China learned about from the terrible examples set by both the Americans and Soviets in Afghanistan, makes them lean away from hard power towards religious minorities unless absolutely necessary. Beijing simply has no desire to welcome a jihad onto itself by carrying on like the two former superpowers did, meaning it will not dispatch the People’s Liberation Army to the region unless economic interests or Chinese nationals are under direct threat.

• A key access point for the Belt and Road corridor runs through Xinjiang, the Uyghur Muslim homeland that likewise borders Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, all countries that would be able to host a jihadist border insurgency. For China to assume anything except a defensive position to protect human capital and infrastructure projects in these locales would be far beyond the realm of the Communist Politboro’s sense of pragmatic self-preservation. Their ‘win-win’ notion of diplomatic engagement, deal-making where nobody leaves the bargaining table with a sour taste in their mouths, precludes an aggressive and reckless engagement methodology. Furthermore, China has trade partners throughout the region, with Israel being one of the largest, and this has implications for how President Xi Jinping has responded to the events following October 7th.

• If the public relations of Beijing is to be believed regarding the Belt and Road Initiative, it could offer a tremendous opportunity for growth in human development terms across some of the most impoverished parts of Eurasia. But in all honesty, it may very well end up being a Chinese version of the Jersey Turnpike. The nice sections of the high-speed rail will be there, yes, but there will also be plenty of off-ramps into small alcoves defined by a Wal-Mart’s presence as the town center.

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• Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, deplored the attacks, which he said were “instigated” by the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, who had said on the eve of the attack that a deal was within reach, said: “I urge the US not to get sucked in further. This is not your war.” Oman downed two drones, while another crashed near its Salalah port on Tuesday, state media said.

• Indonesia, one of the few countries to announce troops for Trump’s Board of Peace’s planned new international security force for Gaza, said it “deeply regrets” the failure of the Iran negotiations – while its president offered to travel to Tehran to reopen dialogue. The Indonesian Ulema Council, an organisation of the country’s Muslim clerics, urged their government to withdraw in protest over the war from the Board of Peace.

• The Trump administration sought neither the approval of the UN security council – as Washington attempted for the Iraq war in 2003 – – or even the approval of elected representatives at home, analysts said.

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