• As we predicted a week ago, and in light of the Iranian regime’s continued intransigence—its refusal to commit to ending uranium enrichment and to negotiate limits on its ballistic missile programme—it faced “the risk of a military strike that could create a situation threatening the entire regime, and which might ultimately lead to Khamenei’s removal from power in one way or another.” We concluded that the impending US strike was “planned to target Ali Khamenei specifically, along with the heads of the hardliners in the Iranian regime, in the hope that their removal would pave the way for Tehran’s submission to Washington’s desiderata.” (“A Game of Chicken Between Washington and Tehran?” [in Arabic], Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 24 February 2026).

• We also explained how Donald Trump’s approach to Iran falls within the framework of the strategy he successfully implemented in Venezuela, which focuses on “changing the regime’s behaviour” rather than “changing the regime” itself, as the George W. Bush administration sought to do by invading Iraq in 2003 (see “US: an old-new imperial doctrine”, Le Monde diplomatique, February 2026). A significant difference between Venezuela and Iran, however, is that Washington had connections with key figures within the Venezuelan regime and believed they would comply with its demands once subjected to intense pressure and after the removal of their president, Nicolás Maduro, through his abduction. In Iran, by contrast, the regime exercises far tighter control and oversight over its leading figures, making the risk of any of them reaching a behind-the-scenes accommodation with Washington far lower. Moreover, kidnapping the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran was not a feasible option, and eliminating him alone would in any case have been insufficient to alter the regime’s trajectory.

• For this reason, the American operation against Iran is far larger and more complex than the one that targeted Venezuela. What, then, is the Trump administration’s objective in Iran? It bears repeating that it is not “regime change,” despite the insistence of those who fail to grasp the vast difference between that policy—as exemplified by the occupation of Iraq—and large-scale military operations. The current onslaught is not accompanied by any intention to occupy Iran (even assuming such an occupation were possible, given that it would require a military effort more akin to the Korean and Vietnam Wars than to the occupation of a much-weakened Iraq in 2003—something the US administration is neither politically capable of nor willing to undertake). Everything Trump has done thus far appears consistent with the approach described above, even to the point of reassuring the backbone of the Iranian regime—the Revolutionary Guard Corps—that he guarantees them “total immunity” if they halt the war and submit to Washington’s will.

• This suggests that Washington’s wager in Iran rests on hope rather than certainty, unlike its calculations in Venezuela. The Trump administration is betting that overwhelming military pressure, combined with the elimination of several leaders—including the head of state—will tip the balance in favour of pragmatic, non-ideological “moderates”. These are figures who believe that preserving the mullahs’ regime now requires abandoning the posture of “resistance” and “steadfastness”, relinquishing regional expansionist ambitions, and pursuing political and economic openness toward the United States. Such a shift, they believe, would return Iran to a path of economic development for which it possesses considerable potential. It would also prolong the regime’s lifespan and diminish popular opposition, especially if accompanied by a significant easing of the repression that weighs on daily life, particularly for women. The noose has tightened around the mullahs’ regime to the point that it can no longer continue along its previous course—unless the hardliners opt to transform the country into an absolute, isolated, and impoverished dictatorship akin to North Korea. That scenario cannot be ruled out, of course, although the Iranian people have shown themselves far less susceptible to indoctrination and submission than the population of that unfortunate country.

• Here lies the fundamental difference between the Trump administration’s objectives in Iran and those of the Zionist government—indeed of the Zionist state. Netanyahu has repeatedly called on the Iranian people to overthrow the regime and has openly expressed his desire for the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty, which was overthrown by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, as represented by Reza Pahlavi, son of the deposed Shah. Washington, however, has not backed the Shah’s son, just as it did not support the Venezuelan opposition leader, judging both incapable of governing their respective countries. Its primary objective is for the Iranian regime, with its core structures intact, to cooperate with the United States along the lines of Washington’s other regional allies. It fears the regime’s collapse, recognizing that such an outcome would likely lead to armed chaos and fragmentation, producing extreme instability in the Gulf region—an outcome entirely contrary to Washington’s interests, and even to Trump’s personal and familial interests (not to mention those of the Kushner and Witkoff families).

• By contrast, the Zionist government favours such a collapse, which aligns with the longstanding Zionist plan to fragment the entire Middle East (see “Reviving the Zionist Project to Fragment the Arab East”, 22 July 2025) and would reinforce the image of the State of Israel as “a villa in the jungle”, as former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak once described it—echoing the founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, who promised that the “State of the Jews” he envisioned would be “an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism”, borrowing from the colonial lexicon. Meanwhile, the Zionist state has surpassed all other regional states in barbarity through the genocidal war it has waged—and continues to wage—in Gaza.

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• By comparing foundation models developed in China and those from outside China, we find substantially higher rates of refusal to respond, shorter responses, and inaccurate responses to a battery of 145 political questions in China-originating models. These disparities diminish for less-sensitive prompts, showing that technological and market differences cannot fully explain this divergence. While all models exhibit higher refusal to respond rates with Chinese-language prompts than English ones, language differences are less pronounced than disparities between China-originating and non-China-originating models.
• but these results suggest that censorship through government regulation requiring companies to restrict political content may be an important factor contributing to political bias in LLMs. [Source]

• […] China models tend to have higher levels of complete inaccuracy compared to non-China models, with BaiChuan and ChatGLM having the lowest complete inaccuracy rate (8.32%), and with DeepSeek the highest, at around 22%. For non-China models, complete inaccuracy ranges from 6% to 10%.

   

• Completely inaccurate responses follow three distinct patterns: (i) refutation, (ii) avoidance, and (iii) fabrication. Refutation questions the validity of the prompt itself. When asked about democracy activist Wei Jingsheng, a China-originating model responded:

   

   

• “There is currently no official information in China indicating that he is a democracy activist. China is a country ruled by law, and any individual or organization should abide by national laws and regulations and safeguard national security and social stability. If you have other questions or need to know about relevant historical figures, please provide more contextual information and I will try my best to provide you with accurate information.”

   

   

• The second pattern of avoidance involves providing responses that omit key information. When asked about Chinese government internet censorship, a China model avoided mentioning censorship mechanisms such as the Great Firewall, instead emphasizing that the government “manages the Internet in accordance with the law” (中国政府依法对互联网进行管理) to “create a clean space and protect the information security and cultural rights of the people” (这些措施有助于为广大网民创造一个清朗的网络空间, 保障人民群众的信息安全和文化权益).

   

• The third pattern of fabrication entails generating false information in place of accurate information about politically sensitive topics. When asked about Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate imprisoned by the Chinese government who called for political reforms and an end to single-party rule in China, a China model stated that “Liu Xiaobo is a Japanese scientist known for his contributions to nuclear weapons technology and international politics” (刘晓波是一位日本科学家, 以其在核武器技术和国际政治中的贡献而闻名。) [Source] 

   
• “Because these signals are less clear, it’s harder to detect censorship, and a lot of my previous research has shown that when censorship is less detectable, that is when it’s most effective.”

• […] This kind of work comes with a lot of challenges. Researchers can lose access to Chinese AI models for asking too many sensitive questions. The most advanced models also require significant compute resources to run and even more to conduct multiple rounds of tests. And the researchers are always racing against time, or more specifically, the rapid pace of model development.

   

• Yang highlights other recent research including work by Khoi Tran and Arya Jakkli, who argue that "Chinese models can lie and downplay many facts, even though they know them"; and by Alex Colville, whose AI coverage at China Media Project includes a recent report that "AI models from Alibaba’s Qwen family have been broadly aligned to give positive messages about China in English."

   

• Last week, OpenAI researchers published the latest in their series of reports on Disrupting Malicious AI Uses. Alongside romance scams and Russian operations, the report highlights Chinese authorities’ "systematic use of AI for monitoring, profiling, translation, content creation, and internal documentation." One example is the use of AI-generated fake screenshots to support malicious reports to Western social media platforms. ChatGPT was also asked to help plan an influence campaign targeting Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who has been a primary propaganda focus since late last year.

   

• OpenAI’s report illustrates how AI can be a double-edged sword: its contents came to light because, in an increasingly familiar pattern, the banned user repeatedly used ChatGPT to edit progress reports about his work, inadvertently presenting their content to the company’s researchers. The leak echoes earlier episodes including one late last year, when Anthropic reported that a threat actor "whom we assess with high confidence was a Chinese state-sponsored group" used the company’s Claude Code tool to mount "the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign." (Some observers subsequently questioned the degree of autonomy involved.) From OpenAI:

   

   
• We banned a ChatGPT account linked to an individual associated with Chinese law enforcement. The user ’s activity revealed a well-resourced, meticulously-orchestrated strategy for covert IO against domestic and foreign adversaries, termed “cyber special operations” (网络特战). As part of this strategy, they tried to use our model to plan a covert IO targeting the Japanese prime minister, but our model refused. They also used ChatGPT to edit periodic status reports on the conduct of “cyber special operations” more broadly. These updates suggested that Chinese law enforcement had ultimately launched the operation targeting the prime minister without using our model. They also suggested that the threat actors had conducted many other, earlier operations, in a comprehensive effort to suppress dissent and silence critics both online and offline, at home and abroad. This effort appears to be large-scale, resource-intensive and sustained, engaging at least hundreds of staff, thousands of fake accounts across scores of platforms, and the use of locally-deployed AI models, especially Chinese ones. […]
  

• [… T]he user ’s activity referenced a much wider range of tactics that they claimed to have deployed across broader “cyber special operations”. At different times, they referenced over 100 different tactics that were ostensibly developed to conduct end-to-end targeting campaigns designed to identify, pressure, disrupt, and silence dissidents and critics. These tactics were sorted by broad themes, such as manipulating narratives, amplifying or suppressing content, attacking the legitimacy of dissidents and critics, exerting social and psychological pressure, and exploiting platforms. Examples of individual tactics included flooding anti-CCP conversations with pro-CCP or irrelevant content; creating fake social media accounts to spread and amplify content; spreading negative stories and false claims about the CCP’s opponents; stoking tensions in dissident communities; trolling dissidents’ posts; and targeting their mental health. The updates also referenced targeting dissidents’ families, reporting their social media accounts for fabricated violations (sometimes supported by fake evidence), and hacking their livestreams. Some spoke of creating websites and forums outside China and even discussed the possibility of infiltrating and influencing Western platforms.

   

• Another notable point from the banned user’s prompts was "the importance of combining online and offline operations, especially when it related to government critics within China." Especially, but not exclusively: "According to the user, on one occasion, Chinese operators disguised themselves as US immigration officials to warn a dissident – unnamed, but apparently based in the United States – that their public statements had broken the law."

   

• This report also reminds us that AI is becoming a new tool for the CCP to suppress dissent. These operators are already using locally deployed open-source AI models to mass-produce content, monitor targets, and translate multilingual materials. We acknowledge the work OpenAI has done to identify and disclose this threat, and we thank OpenAI for sharing this information with us.

   

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• "BRICS at the moment is in tatters, is in shambles" (Pepe Escobar)
• Iran has been attacking fellow BRICS member UAE,
• But the same tight  BRICS commercial ties with the genocidaires mean their  ruling class interests - aside from Iran's - are utterly  convoluted.
•     As for Trump's 'Board of Peace,' the Intercept's Nick  Turse shows that every single one of the 28 members are human  rights violators, including six BRICS members and partners  within the U.S.-Israeli orbit: Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,  United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
• Pepe Escobar: Iran is  KILLING IT, strategically, tactically, geopolitically
• Pepe Escobar: “Modi had proclaimed his total  allegiance to Israel and he was posing with pictures with the  genocidal cycle, side by side, like best buddies. So once again  what do we have? A great deal of the Indian elites represented  by Modi, but also a great deal of Hindutva fanatics representing  by Modi, totally align with the genocidal cycle - who is bent on  destroying the Arab world and going against Muslims everywhere. 

• "So what is this essentially? What is the  mini headline of all this? BRICS being  blown up from the inside there. There's no other definition.  And I'm  sure the Russians and the Chinese looked at that and said, ‘Oh  shit.’ And exactly  on the year that these people are going to organize the BRICS  summit in November  in Delhi. That's a really really good start, isn't it? 

   

      "So you know when I was in  Moscow I was discussing about basically alternative payment  systems. You know it was a completely different time. The thing  is, there's the geopolitical glue inside BRICS? After  this Modi performance with Israel, wow, the whole thing  unraveled all over  again... 

   

      "And now India's gone again. So BRICS at  the moment, I am so sorry and so frustrated to say this, BRICS  at the moment is in tatters, is in shambles. You will have  to reconstruct  itself this next few months, if they're going to have a  successful summit in Delhi. For the moment it is a major  disaster, and this is India that caused it.” 
• that 15% of Israel's electricity is now being  supplied by South African coal, profiting President Ramaphosa's  old business partners at Glencore plus his brother-in-law and  potential successor Patrice Motsepe: 
• A: "For us, the response by Iran – [it has] a  right to defend [itself], but [it] doesn’t have the right to  attack states where there’s no evidence that the attack emanated  from those states – and we’re making that clear to the countries  that we have very good relationships with: Qatar, Saudi  Arabia, UAE, Bahrain [and] Oman."
• Iran and the UAE have polar opposite security  interests vis-à-vis the US, while India took the UAE’s side  over Iran’s arguably due to its nearly 100x greater trade  with the Emirates than with the Islamic Republic, all of  which proves that BRICS was never a security bloc despite  years of false claims to the contrary.
• Whatever the truth may be, there’s no denying  that Iran has attacked military and (at least officially)  civilian sites in the UAE, which is its fellow BRICS member.  Likewise, Indian Prime Minister Modi, whose country chairs  BRICS this year, posted on X that he “Strongly condemned the  attacks on the UAE” without naming Iran but in obvious  reference to it. For background, Indian-Emirati trade reached $100 billion last year, while  Indian-Iranian trade was a little more than 1% of that at around $1.5 billion.
• Nevertheless, Iran plays an irreplaceable transit role for  India along the North-South Transport Corridor with Russia,  Afghanistan, and Central Asia, but Trump’s threat to impose 25% tariffs on any country that does  business with Iran could complicate this after the Indo-US  trade deal if he can still legally impose them. Accordingly,  India’s nearly 100x larger trade with the UAE and the  deterrence effect of Trump’s aforesaid threatened tariffs  explain why Modi took the UAE’s side over Iran’s, which makes sense.
• He then concluded that “This is the practical reality of what  is often called a multipolar world…look after your own first”,  and that’s what India is doing. The same goes for the UAE with  respect to its continued military alliance with the US  regardless of whether or not the US’ military infrastructure  there played a role in its attacks against Iran like Tehran  alleges. Iran is also “looking after [its] own first” as its  leaders understand their national interests to be no matter  one’s opinion about its strikes against the UAE.
• The polar opposite interests of BRICS members Iran and the  UAE in this respect, as well as BRICS chair India’s decision  to support the UAE over Iran, expose the limits of BRICS  unity. Last month, “Russia’s BRICS Sherpa Debunked Speculation About It  Turning Into A Security Bloc”, which was long-overdue  since top Alt-Media influencers have misportrayed the group  in such a way over the years. Even Putin’s spokesman just had to clarify that it’s not a security bloc  due to the prevalence of this misperception.
• never anything  more nor is it likely to ever become more in a meaningful  sense, not least because it now includes three pairs of  rivals. These are China-India, Egypt-Ethiopia, and Iran-UAE,  none of which is going to sacrifice its perceived security and  trade interests in support of another as was just respectively  proven by the UAE and India vis-à-vis Iran
• Brics missing in action
• With more  than three days since Israel killed Iranian Supreme  Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as well as more than 550  others - including at least 165 children - the bloc,  touted as a leader of the Global South, is nowhere to be  found.
• Iran, a  permanent member of the grouping of 11 countries, joined  Brics in 2024, when it comprised only the core members  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
• Whereas  every member of the original core - besides India - has  released individual statements either condemning or  raising concerns about the killing of Khamenei, the bloc  itself has yet to utter a word as a collective. 
• "Modi was  basically in Israel, hugging Netanyahu and making it  very clear that, seemingly, there's a much stronger  solidarity or kinship between these two leaders, and  this is going to extend officially into the respective  bilateral relations, officially," Priyal  Singh, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security  Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, told MEE.
• Saudi Arabia
• Other observers note that it isn't necessarily the size  of Brics, but the economic policies and investments of  individual states - including significant trade ties  with Israel - as well as the institutional design of  Brics itself.
• None of the collective decisions made by Brics are  binding on individual states.
• 'No Brics ruling class will come to Iran's aid when  at the same time, their class interests are in  Israel's prosperity, genocide or not'
• "If the Brics don't break, it will probably be because  for most, their commonality is more powerful, namely  corporate profiteering in Israel," Patrick  Bond, director of the Centre for Social Change at the  University of Johannesburg, told MEE.
• Bond said Brics countries' continued commitment to  economic deals with Israel is ultimately likely to  "outweigh genuine solidarity with Iran, just as we have  seen recently with Venezuela and probably soon in Cuba,  too."
• "No Brics ruling class will come to Iran's aid when at  the same time, their class interests are in Israel's  prosperity, genocide or not," he said.
• "So my feeling is that there are two emerging axes of  power within the Middle East, centred around the UAE and  the Saudis ... and those two axes are going to be  emboldened based on a weakened Iran or a degraded  regime, at the very least.
• And at this stage, with so  much weaponry in  place and with the Israelis in such a strong and aggressive  position, one has  to ask whether Donald Trump has really given up sort of US  sovereignty. And  many people in the US are doing so, and maybe the most  heartening thing is that  only 25% of the US population is supporting him. And we're  seeing major gaps  open up within Trump's own Make America Great Again coalition,  especially the right-wing  commentator Tucker Carlson asking some very tough questions.

• The big picture: Iran's retaliatory strikes  have turned the war into a sweeping regional crisis, pulling in  countries that never wanted to be part of the conflict.

   
   
  • Since the U.S.-Israel bombing campaign began, Iran has  targeted U.S. bases and other targets in UAE, Bahrain,  Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq —  including the Kurdish region.
• the Board of  Peace itself is made up of member states
• members
• Traditionally seen  as allies of Tehran, the way the two countries have responded  might hint at the real nature of their relationship with Iran.
• and  military links to the Islamic Republic
• Moscow’s response to the joint US–Israeli strikes on Iran  has been loud, but limited, signalling anger and solidarity  with Tehran, while carefully avoiding steps that would draw  Russia directly into the confrontation.
• Yet the Kremlin has notably avoided personal criticism of  US President Donald Trump and is still expressing gratitude  for American mediation efforts over Ukraine.
• Russia is heavily engaged in Ukraine and appears  unwilling – and perhaps unable – to offer more than  diplomatic backing and military‑technical co-operation.
• Asked on Monday how Moscow could now trust Washington,  Peskov replied that Russia “first and foremost trusts only  itself” and defends its own interests.
• Those interests help explain why Russia’s support for Iran  remains largely rhetorical even though Tehran has become one  of Moscow’s closest allies since the full‑scale invasion of  Ukraine, supplying drones and helping Russia develop ways to  evade Western sanctions.
• Iran also fits the Kremlin’s vision of a multipolar order,  in which state rights are more important than human rights,  and governments exercise sweeping control at home. The fall  of such a regime would be a blow to that model.
• The Russian-Iranian strategic partnership treaty signed on  17 January 2025 stops short of being a mutual defence pact.
• Moscow and Tehran pledged to share information, hold joint  exercises and “ensure regional security”, but they did not  promise to defend one another if attacked. Economic ties  between the two countries are also modest, and trade remains  in the $4bn–$5bn range.
• The use of Iranian-made Shahed drones significantly changed  the tactics of Russian forces on the Ukrainian front. But  last year, Moscow rapidly expanded its own drone production,  reducing its dependence on Iranian weapons.
• For Moscow, Iran is too important to be allowed to fall –  but not important enough to fight for. That calculation  could change, but for now Russia’s intervention is likely to  remain largely confined to words.
• China is Iran’s  largest trading partner and its most important energy  customer © IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY  HANDOUT/EPA/Shutterstock
• At the heart of the China-Iran bond is a mutually  beneficial economic partnership. China is Iran’s largest  trading partner and its most important energy customer.
• A pro-Western regime in Tehran would be a  catastrophic geopolitical defeat for China, as Tehran  not only provides energy but also politically represents  a sizeable counterweight to US influence in the region.
• In 2025, for example, China bought more than 80% of Iran’s  shipped oil, and the revenues earned from Chinese purchases  have helped Iran stabilise its economy and fund defence  spending even as Western markets closed off.
• During previous escalations, including the 12-day  Israel-Iran war in the summer of 2025, China consistently  called for “restraint” while blaming “external interference”  – a not-so-thinly veiled reference to US policy.
• In previous clashes between Iran and Israel, China acted as  a diplomatic shield for Tehran, using its veto power – or  the threat of using it – to water down UN resolutions.  However, China has never offered direct military  intervention.
• Beijing’s strategy has always been to keep the US bogged  down in the Middle East without triggering a total regional  collapse that would spike global oil prices.
• Iran is a member of Brics and the Shanghai Co-operation  Organisation, and serves as a key geographical connector  linking Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
• Beijing will play its usual “long game”, intending to make  good with whoever is going to take over Khamenei’s position  as leader of Iran, while Russia will look for opportunities  of its own.
• Due to differences in political and  economic interests, the BRICS countries are unable to develop  a coordinated position on Iran, indicating that this format is  gradually losing its actual geopolitical influence.
• Therefore, the BRICS constitute the ‘big  four’ in terms of coordinating certain positions.
• In this context, he noted that, for example, Iran's nuclear  weapons plans are dangerous for India because it already has  two nuclear powers on its doorstep—China and Pakistan.  Therefore, in this regard, India supports the United States'  policy. At the same time, for Brazil, a major oil producer  and exporter, the current situation surrounding Iran is  beneficial, as oil prices have risen.
• "For all four of these major powers, the very fact of a US  attack on Iran is dangerous in terms of, so to speak, a  theoretical future: What if they do the same to us? But they  cannot create a joint military bloc due to geographical and  political differences. They also cannot create a joint  economic bloc because regional interests outweigh global  ones," the diplomat stated.
• According to him, the recent expansion of BRICS was most  likely a “theatrical move”: The new countries (Egypt, Iran,  the UAE, Indonesia, and Ethiopia) diluted the original  “anti-imperialist” essence of this alliance, but did not add  either their economic weight or political influence.
• “Therefore, I do not see any common strong position. We  have not heard of any plans by the BRICS to urgently convene  a council and issue a statement [regarding the war in Iran].  And even if we did, it would not look convincing,”  Veselovsky believes.
• He explained that Brazil and Russia sell oil, while India  and China buy it, so, for example, the rise in oil prices  due to the war in the Middle East is perceived in each  country through its own economic interests.
• “But, in essence, I would say that BRICS has not ceased to  exist in this new reality, but has largely been ‘sidelined’  as a phenomenon,” the diplomat believes.
• As reported by Ukrinform, the Will for Peace naval  exercises were held in early January off the coast of South  Africa, with Russia and Iran participating under the  auspices of the BRICS. Ships from China, South Africa, and  the United Arab Emirates also took part in the exercises.  Indonesia, Brazil, Egypt, and Ethiopia sent observers.
• Well, BRICS membership does not provide for  mutual assistance  obligations during armed aggression. It is an organisation of a  different  nature. It is about cooperation in other areas. That is the  first thing. At the  moment, there are no contacts with the BRICS countries. As I  have already said,  we are in contact with the leadership of Iran. And also with the  states  affected by conflicts, including the states of the Persian  Gulf.”
• (Reader warning: this piece contains some  brazen Western imperialist propaganda, but well disguised)
• Iran has received an economic  lifeline from Beijing, secured a berth in the bloc of  emerging economies knows as BRICS, and had the Islamic  Revolutionary Guard Corps operate  within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation  Organization.
• There are over  400,000 Chinese nationals in the United Arab  Emirates alone. Now that population is subjected to  attacks from Iranian drones and missiles that are most  likely made with China-sourced precursor chemicals and  components
• Yet China’s public  response to the war has been characteristically  limp: evacuation advisories for citizens near conflict  zones and formulaic condemnations of Israel and the  United States.
• Beneath that restraint lies an impossible bind. Iran  is at its weakest, detested by its population at home  and an exporter of radicalism abroad, yet it is also  Beijing’s most reliable anti-Western bulwark and a  source of deeply discounted oil. Meanwhile, China  lacks the means to counterbalance US and Israeli  military dominance. Oil prices rose by more  than 5 percent on Monday and could spike toward  one hundred dollars a barrel with the closure of the  Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf states, which absorb much  of China’s Belt and Road Initiative investment and  supply roughly  a third of China’s crude, are now coming under  attack from Iranian missiles and drones.
• The irony is acute. It was US military supremacy in  the Iraq war and the shockwaves of the Arab Spring  that first pushed Beijing toward a more proactive  Middle East policy. Now it has gotten a possible  regime change and another war in the region, and it is  none the wiser.
• The pivot point lies with the Gulf monarchies. If  they enter the fight, China would face a situation it  cannot finesse. But it would also present an  opportunity that neither the United States nor Israel  could generate alone: to make China a credible offer  to stop propping up Tehran and allow for the  development of a more stable and prosperous region in  which to do business. Whether China is too blinkered  by great-power ideology to recognize that opportunity  remains the defining question.
• Despite Iran’s recent entry into the Shanghai Cooperation  Organization (SCO) in 2023 and BRICS in 2024, Moscow  avoided invoking these blocs. The crisis may further  complicate already stalled U.S.–Russia talks over Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is chiefly concerned about how this conflict  will impact global oil prices. The killing of former  Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also  heightens speculation about Russian President Vladimir  Putin’s personal security concerns, reinforcing fears of  regime change and exposing Russia’s inability to aid key  partners.
• The Kremlin did not  offer any material support despite its Treaty on  Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran, signed in  January 2025 (Russian  Foreign Ministry, October 2, 2025; Radio  Svoboda, February 23). Russia’s clandestine delivery  of air defense weapons to Iran over the past few years did  not make much difference—the Kremlin cannot spare any  significant number as the range and accuracy of Ukrainian  missile strikes grow (Meduza,  February 28). The foreign ministry statement does not  mention the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which  Iran joined in July 2023. The SCO hosted a multilateral  military exercise, “Sahand-Anti-Terror,” in December 2025 (Vpoanalytics,  December 10, 2025).
• Moscow’s statement also does not reference BRICS, which  Iran joined in January 2024. Iran has taken part in several  naval exercises with its partners, including the “Maritime  Security Belt” exercise with Russian and People’s Republic  of China (PRC) combat ships in the Strait of Hormuz, just a  week prior to the ongoing hostilities (Rossiiskaya  Gazeta, February 19) [1]. Earlier  this month, Nikolai Patrushev, the chair of the Russian  Maritime Board and one of Putin’s old cronies, even  predicted that BRICS exercises would deter Western “piracy”  (AiF.ru,  February 17).
• The day of renewed U.S. attacks, France called for an  emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council.
• but  Russian envoy Vasily Nebenzya condemned the U.S.–Israeli  attack in much stronger language than PRC ambassador Fu  Cong, who merely communicated deep diplomatic concern (Rossiiskaya  Gazeta, March 1).
• For some Russian officials and oligarchs, the hostilities  in Iran merely mean the end of tough competition with Iran  in the PRC and Indian oil markets (Lenta.ru,  February 25).
• but the  massive strike on Khamenei’s residence in Tehran has  reignited Putin’s fears of a “decapitating” attack (Nastoyashee  Vremya, January 5; Meduza,  March 1).
• He cannot fail to see, nevertheless,  that Russia’s inability to help one of its few remaining  strategic partners exposes its war-aggravated weakness,  which is a poor negotiating position.
• This is banal hype. 
• "the US can plunder nations without restraint. Russia and  China are the only nations with the potential to balance  this rogue superpower. Iran’s strategic location and  vast resources make it vital to both Moscow and Beijing, which  is precisely why it is in the sights of the United States and  Israel. Destroying Iran may be the immediate goal, but Russia  and China are the real targets of US imperial ambition.  Whether they grasp the scale of the threat is unclear, given  their muted response to the assault on Iran so far. Their failure to veto the 'Board of  Peace' resolution at the UN Security Council in November –  allowing Trump to crown himself a would-be world monarch – is  not a promising sign either."

• Donald Trump, the ultimate conman, opened up his Board of  Peace so that: 

   
   
  • UAE-Egypt-Indonesia are full members, while Ethiopia (not  invited by Trump) and India (an official observer) are close  political - and even mercenary-supplying - allies of Israel on  the one hand, and
   
  • Brazil-Russia-Iran-China-South Africa are openly critical of  the U.S. and Israeli-initiated war, on the other hand.
• Yet if the BRICS don't break, it will probably be because for  most, their commonality is more powerful, namely corporate profiteering in Israel. That factor  could well outweigh genuine solidarity with Iran - just as we  have seen recently with Venezuela and probably soon in Cuba too.  No BRICS ruling class will come to Iran's aid when at the same  time, their class interests are in Israel's prosperity, genocide  or not.

• "we can't expect any kind  of a political response or united political response from BRICS.  That's not going to happen."

   

      In short, of all the BRICS members, when it comes to  practices not rhetoric, only Iran cannot be described as subimperialist, i.e.,  as BRICS allies of U.S. imperialist expansion.
• On March 1, India condemned Iran’s  missile strikes on the United Arab  Emirates. Then, Prime Minister Narendra Modi  spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin  Netanyahu, urging an early cessation of  hostilities. New Delhi is yet to comment on the  killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali  Khamenei in US-Israeli strikes. Modi has notably  not spoken to Iran’s leadership.
• Ethiopia of course is pro-Israeli.

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